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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS: SECTION 1983 REDRESS
FOR THE DEPRIVED DEBTOR
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act may well rival section lob of
the Securities and Exchange Act in the volume of federal litigation it
has precipitated. Indeed, newspaper headlines tout with increasing fre-
quency the demise of public officials held personally liable for damages
caused by their official conduct. Often, liability is imposed under sec-
tion 1983 because the plaintiff was deprived of a newly-surfaced con-
stitutional right which previously lurked in obscurity behind broad
concepts such as equal protection, privacy, or due process. Among
these astounded officials have been prison and correction officers, public
employers, school board superintendents, law enforcement officers, and
zoning boards.1
Supreme Court decisions in 1969 and 1972, moreover, portend the
addition of the ubiquitous creditor to the growing list of section 1983
defendants. For years, creditors and secured parties have garnished,
replevied, repossessed, and attached the property of defaulting debtors
without the burden of a judicial hearing, unaware that such seemingly
harmless conduct might subject them to personal liability to the debtor.
But Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,2 Lynch v. Household Finance
Corp.,3 and Fuentes v. Shevin,4 when read together, suggest that such
prejudgment seizures are violative of the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment, and that if those practices are effected, the aggrieved
debtor may obtain relief in federal court under section 1983 of the
Civil Rights Act.
The thesis question of this Note is whether such a suggestion is indeed
tenable. In forming an affirmative answer to this inquiry, the develop-
ment of section 1983 must be considered, and an analysis of its essential
elements must be undertaken.
1. See generally Johnson, Exclusionary Zoning: Damage Actions Under the Cisil
Rights Act, 1971 LAW & Soc. ORDER 538; Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape
and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 277 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Shapo]h
Comment, 46 IND. L.J. 521 (1971).
2. 395 US. 337 (1969).
3. 92 S. Ct. 1113 (1972).
4. 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972).
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THE EVOLUTION OF SECTION 1983
Section 1983-Its Beginning
Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regu-
lation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.5
A creditor's liability, to be sure, is not immediately evident from the
face of the statute; the success of any action under section 1983 will
be determined by the meaning ascribed to the terms "rights... secured
by the Constitution" and "color of [law]." 6 Since there are to date
unanswered questions concerning the interpretation of these terms, and
since the precise intent and consequent use of section 1983 is unsettled,
a brief look at its history and judicial development is necessary.
The statute derived from an attempt by the Reconstruction Congress
to impress upon the states some of the ideals for which the Civil War
had been fought. After prohibiting slavery via the thirteenth amend-
ment, Congress passed the Freedmen's Bureau Bill and a concurrent
civil rights act,7 which together were intended to extend legislative pro-
tection to all United States citizens who were victimized because of
their status as former slaves or Negro sympathizers. Neither bill was
designed exclusively to protect Negroes, although both were meant to
prohibit atrocities committed by an individual or the state."
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). The jurisdictional counterpart to section 1983 reads:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action au-
thorized by law to be commenced by any person: . ..
To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by
the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing
for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States....
28 U.S.C. § 1343 (3) (1970).
6. See note 62-85 infra & accompanying text.
7. Act of April 9, 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).




The Act of April 9, 1866, did not satisfy its major proponents. They
felt that it was susceptible to repeal by a less sympathetic future Con-
gress. Thus, a permanent solution was attained by the passage of the
fourteenth amendment, which was intended to include all the provisions
and protections that the 1866 Act had extended to its beneficiariesY
Notwithstanding its lofty purpose, the fourteenth amendment failed
to accomplish the desired result. Reconstruction brought bitter political
conflict to the legislature, accompanied by rampant lawlessness through-
out the South.10 To combat this disruption, as well as to assure the amend-
ment's enforcement, Congress passed the Act of April 20, 1871. Section
1 of this act was later codified in section 1983.
The purpose of section 1983 was manifest, but its scope and imple-
mentation were not clear; although it was enacted to assure federal con-
trol in the face of shirked state responsibility, the class of persons sought
to be protected was the subject of varied opinions. Some Congressmen
voted for its passage in the belief that it was to be applied only in alle-
viating the plight of Negroes. Both the Congressional floor debates"
and American history lend credence to this view. But more reliable
evidence of what Congress intended is to be found in the introductory
speech of the bill's floor manager:
The model [for section 1 of the 1871 Act] will be found in the
second section of the act of April 9, 1866, known as the "civil
rights act." That section provides a criminal proceeding in iden-
tically the same case as this one provides a civil remedy for, except
that the deprivation under color of State law must, under the civil
rights act, have been on account of race, color, or former slavery.
This section of the bill, on the same state of facts, not only provides
a civil remedy for persons whose former condition may have been
that of slaves, but also to all people, where, under color of State
law, they or any of them may be deprived of rights to which they
are entitled under the Constitution by reason and virtue of their
national citizenship. 12
9. Id. at 1328-29.
10. See, e.g., J. BURGEss, RcoNsTmucnoN AND TE CONsrTunoN-1866-1876, 251-52
(1902). See also Shapo, supra note 1, at 279-82; Comment, Federal Comity, Official Im-
munity, and the Dilemma of Section 1983, 1967 DuKE LJ. 741, 743-48 [hereinafter cited
as Federal Comity].
11. See, e.g., CoNG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 514 (1871), remarks of Representative
Poland of Vermont.
12. Id. at appendix, at 68 (emphasis supplied).
1973]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Other than these two views concerning the scope of section 1983,
manifestations of legislative intent were scarce. It was thus left to the
courts to decide just how the act was to work; in the century follow-
ing its enactment, section 1983 became one of the most potent weapons
available to ensure the protection of fundamental human rights.
Section 1983 in the Supreme Court
The developing judicial interpretation of section 1983 has been any-
thing but predictable. Although the instant provision was not specifi-
cally at issue, in United States v. Cruikshank,3 the Supreme Court in
1875 undermined the 1866 Civil Rights Act by holding that an action
alleging a denial of equal protection could not be maintained under the
fourteenth amendment, since the duty insuring equality of treatment
"was originally assumed by the States; and it still remains there." 14 The
same reasoning was advanced in rejecting an alleged violation of the
plaintiff's first amendment right of assembly.' Section 1983 also was sub-
jected to this restrictive interpretation. In Holt v. Indiana Manufacturing
Co.,-6 the statute was invoked in 1899 by an Indiana corporation to
challenge an allegedly unconstitutional assessment of personal taxes.
The Court branded section 1983 in one sentence with an interpretation
that was to last for 72 years: "Assuming that [the civil rights acts] are
still in force, it is sufficient to say that they refer to civil rights only
and are inapplicable here." 17 Thus Holt definitively excluded property
right infringement from the purview of the statute.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, then, section 1983 was
limited to unconstitutional state deprivations of civil rights, and the
words "secured by the Constitution" were construed to apply only to
a deprivation of newly conferred rights which were granted concur-
rendy with United States citizenship under the fourteenth amendment.
Since state infringement of property rights already had been consid-
ered a violation before the amendment was adopted, it was not redres-
sable in federal court. This interpretation endured, and few plaintiffs
13. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
14. Id. at 555.
15. Id. at 552.
16. 176 U.S. 68 (1900).
17. Id. at 72.
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attempted to invoke section 1983 to protect an economic interest for
many years thereafter.'
In 1939, the Supreme Court ruled on a case which helped to move
property interests a bit closer to section 1983 protection. In Hague v.
CIO,9 the members of a labor union sued several Jersey City officials
alleging a conspiracy to deprive union members of their first amend-
ment rights of assembly and free speech. Unlike Cruikshank, Hague
recognized federal jurisdiction for this cause of action, interpreting
"secured" to mean "protected." It no longer mattered that the rights
deprived were redressable in the state courts prior to the adoption of
the Constitution; if the Constitution provided protection as well, a
federal suit could be maintained to guarantee that protection. The
burden of Cruikshank was gone. Section 1983 could be invoked, as it
was here, to seek a remedy for the deprivation of constitutional rights
by the state. Yet one important limitation remained. Justice Stone
pointed out that the jurisdictional counterpart of the act gave federal
courts authorization to hear section 1983 cases without regard to the
amount in controversy. This was seemingly irreconcilable with the
Judiciary Act of 1875 which gave federal courts jurisdiction only in
cases where the amount in controversy met a specified minimum.2° The
Justice resolved the conflict by interpreting the two provisions to-
gether to mean that Congress intended section 1983 to be applied where
the amount in controversy was not susceptible of monetary valuation.
What resulted was a statement that remained precedent until 1972:
The conclusion seems inescapable that the right conferred by the
Act of 1871 to maintain a suit in equity in the federal courts to
protect the suitor against a deprivation of rights or immunities
secured by the Constitution, has been preserved, and that whenever
the right or immunity is one of personal liberty, not dependent for
its existence upon the infringement of property rights, there is
jurisdiction in the district court .... 21
18. Comment, The Civil Rights Act: Emergence of an Adequate Federal Civil
Remedy?, 26 IND. L.J. 361, 366 (1951). See, e.g., Gobitis v. Minersville School Dist.,
21 F. Supp. 581 (E.D. Pa. 1937), reVd on other grounds, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
19. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
20. Act of March 25, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470. The jurisdictional amount then was
$500. It subsequently has been raised several times to the present $10,000. 28 U.S.C.
S 1332 (1970).
21. 307 U.S. at 531-32 (Stone, J., separate opinion) (emphasis supplied). Note that
no majority opinion was written in Hague; Justice Stone's opinion carried as much
weight with the lower courts as did Justice Roberts'. But see note 41 infra.
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Thus, the property right-personal right distinction was perpetuated,
but in a new and less compelling form.
During the next decade, further qualifications were placed upon the
statute. United States v. Classic22 and Screws v. United States s rein-
forced each other in defining deprivation under "color of state law" as
"misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible
only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state
law ... ,, 24 Both cases dealt with section 242 of the United States Code,
a criminal provision closely approximating the core of section 1983,25
and they were important insofar as they aided in the construction of
the statute when later cases arose. They were especially meaningful in
deciding that actions contrary to state law could be just as culpable as
actions in pursuance of it. Earlier Supreme Court decisions had held
that the former were not actionable under section 1983.6
Another significant case was Snowden v. Hughes,27 which was more
relevant for what it refused to decide than for what it actually held.
The Court found that the denial by the state of the right to run for
political office was neither actionable under the fourteenth amendment
nor cognizable under section 1983. Of particular importance was the
Court's discussion of the relationship between sovereign immunity prin-
ciples and section 1983.28 Although the Court found it unnecessary
22. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
23. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
24. 313 U.S. at 326.
25. Section 242 reads:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom,
wilfully subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected
by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punish-
ments, pains, or penalties, on account of such inhabitant being an alien,
or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment
of citizens, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more
than one year, or both; and if death results shall be subject to imprisonment
for any term of years or for life.
18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970). The Classic-Screws definition of "color of state law" was re-
affirmed in Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 99 (1951).
26. See, e.g., Lane v. Wilson, 307 US. 268 (1939); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536
(1927); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915). These were all cases in which a
state official was held to be acting "under color of law" when he deprived Negroes of
their right to vote. See also notes 75-85 infra & accompanying text.
27. 321 U.S. 1 (1944).
28. For a later treatment of this question, see Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367
(1951). See also notes 104-38 infra & accompanying text.
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to decide whether the Snowden facts could be considered state action
within the meaning of the statute, it impliedly recognized that state offi-
cials and agencies could be held liable in a proper fact situation.
In 1961, another major step was taken toward expanding and clari-
fying some of the unsettled questions concerning section 1983 actions.
In Monroe v. Pape,-9 several Chicago policemen broke into the plain-
tiff's home in the early hours of the morning without a search warrant
and made his family stand naked in the living room while they ransacked
their house. Mr. Monroe was then taken into custody and detained
for 10 hours while he was questioned about a murder that had taken
place two days earlier. He was given no hearing, was allowed to make
no telephone calls, and subsequently was released without charges being
made against him. The Monroes sued both the City of Chicago and
the policemen under the Civil Rights Statute.
Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, examined in detail the his-
torical development of section 1983. Although the facts seemed ready-
made for an application of section 1983, he concluded that the statute
was not intended to expose municipalities to liability, and thereby dis-
missed the complaint against the City of Chicago. But in saying that
"19[83] should be read against the background of tort liability that
makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions," 30
the Court proceeded to hold that the plaintiffs had stated a cause of
action against the policemen. The defense of immunity seemingly was
unavailable to state officials or, at least, law enforcers.3' The opinion
also sounded the final demise of the state versus national rights doctrine,
stating that if a valid cause of action is alleged, section 1983 meant to
establish an original federal forum for redress regardless of the fact
that a state remedy was available: "[T]he latter need not be first sought
and refused before the federal one is invoked." 3 2 The Supreme Court
thus further opened the door to plaintiffs who formerly could not have
maintained an action under the statute. Some questions remained un-
answered, one of which was whether a cause of action could be main-
tained for the unconstitutional deprivation of a mere property right
through state action. An attempt was made to resolve those issues in
the following years.33
29. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
30. Id. at 187.
31. This interpretation was short-lived. See notes 104-09 infra & accompanying text.
32. 365 U.S. at 183.
33. See notes 41, 49-51 infra & accompanying text.
1973]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
THE DEBTORS' TRIUMVIRATE-SNIADACH, LYNCH, AND FUENTES
Prior to 1969, it was not apparent that prejudgment seizures were
violative of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment; thus,
section 1983 was of little value to aggrieved debtors. In the event of
a debtor's default, the creditor usually sought a writ from the nearest
court clerk and either garnished the debtor's wages or repossessed the
goods as provided for by an appropriate state statute.34 If the debtor
responded by alleging a denial of due process of law, the courts typi-
cally denied relief. Judicial acquiescence normally was explained in
language similar to that used by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in
Family Finance Corp. v. Sniadach, where it was said that "garnishment
before judgment proceedings does not involve any final determination
of the title to a defendant's property, but merely preserves the status quo
thereof pending determination of the principal action. The defendant
receives notice and a hearing before being permanently deprived of his
or her property." 35 Furthermore, it was said that an action alleging a
denial of due process could not be brought in a federal court under sec-
tion 1983 because the personal rights-property rights distinction was still
applicable under the Hague reasoning. 6
A trio of recent Supreme Court decisions have reversed this rationale.
The first was Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.37 At issue was the
Wisconsin wage garnishment statute which permitted the creditor's
lawyer, upon request to the court clerk, to serve his debtor's employer
with a summons and to compel the debtor's wages to be frozen until
the merits of the creditor's claim could be determined in a subsequent
suit.38 Mrs. Sniadach protested the garnishment order, alleging that the
Wisconsin statute which allowed her wages to be withheld was an
34. Before it was amended, the New York replevin statute allowed seizure of goods
by the sheriff upon delivery to him of an affidavit, requisition, and undertaking by
the alleged rightful owner. N.Y.R. Cirv. PRAc. 7102(a) (McKinney 1963). The statute
was changed to comply with the Supreme Court's ruling in Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct.
1983 (1972). The statute now requires that the sheriff seize goods only in pursuance
of a judicial order. N.Y.R. Civ. PRAc. 7102 (a) (McKinney 1963).
35. 37 Wis. 2d 163, -- , 154 N.W.2d 259, 262 (1967), reversed, 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
There were, of course, other approaches. See Note, Protecting the Lo'w Income Con,-
sumzer: Procedural Due Process Revisited, 14 WM. & MARY L. REy. 337, 341 [hereinafter
cited as Due Process Revisited].
36. But see note 41 infra.
37. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
38. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 267.02 (1957). The statute has since been amended. Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 267.04(1) (Supp. 1972).
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unconstitutional violation of due process,3 9 inasmuch as it deprived her
of the use and enjoyment of her money until the trial on the merits and
forestalled any opportunity for her to forward any defense she might
have against the creditor. The Court agreed: "Where the taling of
one's property is so obvious, it needs no extended argument to conclude
that absent notice and a prior hearing, this prejudgment garnishment
procedure violates the fundamental principles of due process." 40
It should be noted that Mrs. Sniadach did not sue Family Finance in
a federal court under section 1983; her claim of a due process violation
was made in a show cause order following the institution of the garnish-
ment proceedings. At the time of her contention, she would have had
little success under the act-she was alleging infringement of a mere
property right,41 and her creditor was an individual, not the state.
Moreover, the Court's holding that prejudgment garnishment absent
prior notice and hearing was a violation of due process did not establish
the jurisdictional element necessary for a section 1983 action.
39. Mrs. Sniadach also alleged an equal protection violation, which was not con-
sidered either by the Wisconsin Court or by the Supreme Court.
40. 395 U.S. at 341-42.
41. Most federal courts did not feel this criterion necessary to maintain a cause of
action under section 1983. Although Hague's personal rights-property rights distinction
had not yet been discounted by the Supreme Court, the lower courts either rejected the
differentiation or reasoned around it, allowing section 1983 claims alleging the un-
constitutionality of a prejudgment seizure of property. See, e.g., Serritella v. Engelman,
339 F. Supp. 738 (D.N.J. 1972) (welfare benefits as more than a property right);
McMeans v. Schwartz, 330 F. Supp. 1397 (S.D. Ala. 1971) (garnishment proceeding
contested under section 1983 with no mention of the Hague distinction); Epps v.
Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (replevin action contested under section
1983; allowed because complaint alleged a fourth amendment violation via Monroe v.
Pape); Reeves v. Motor Contract Co, 324 F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (same as Mc-
Means); Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (ED. Pa. 1970) (landlord's lien contested;
section 1983 action allowed since "more" than property rights involved); Laprease v.
Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (ND.N.Y. 1970) (replevin action con-
tested; allowed because of a fourth amendment allegation); Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp.
109 (ND. Cal. 1970) (landlord's lien contested under section 1983; allowed because
deprivation of all personal belongings was not a "mere" property right); Goliday v.
Robinson, 305 F. Supp. 1224 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (benefit termination contested under
section 1983; jurisdiction not discussed); Joe Louis Milk Co. v. Hershey, 243 F. Supp.
351 (N.D. Ill. 1965) (wrongful assessment of insurance alleged under section 1983;
Hague distinction expressly rejected). Contra, Weddle v. Director, 436 F.2d 342 (4th
Cir. 1970); Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969); Bussie v. Long, 383 F.2d
766 (5th Cir. 1967); Howard v. Higgins, 379 F.2d 227 (10th Cir. 1967). See also earlier
cases in related areas noted in Shapo, supra note 1, at 291-94.
Due to the split of authority, for purposes of discussion Hague will be presumed
to be a barrier to a section 1983 suit until Lynch definitively eliminates the personal-
property distinction.
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There was, to be sure, much litigation following Sniadach on behalf
of litigants who sought rulings of unconstitutionality for all types of
prejudgment seizures, including garnishment,42 replevin,4 benefit ter-
mination,44 and liens.45 Some courts restricted the Sniadach principle
to wage garnishments,46 while others extended it to all types of non-
notice, non-hearing seizures.41 Meanwhile, the lower federal courts
began to relax the requirements for section 1983 jurisdiction. The
specter of Hague remained, but a trend away from its restrictions was
evident.48 A Connecticut housewife finally won a significant battle for
all aggrieved debtors-access to the federal courts.
42. McMeans v. Schwartz, 330 F. Supp. 1397 (SD. Ala. 1971); Reeves v. Motor
Contract Co, 324 F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Termplan, Inc. v. Superior Cr.,
105 Ariz. 270, 463 P.2d 68 (1969); Arnold v. Knettle, 10 Ariz. App. 509, 460 P.2d 45
(1969); Sackln v. Kersting, 10 Ariz. App. 340, 458 P.2d 544 (1969), rehearing denied,
105 Ariz. 566, 468 P.2d 925 (1970); McCallop v. Carberry, 1 Cal. 3d 903, 464 P.2d 122,
83 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1970); Mills v. Bartlett, 265 A.2d 39, (Del. Super. 1970); Jones
Press, Inc. v. Motor Travel Services, Inc., 176 N.W.2d 87 (Minn. 1970); Ware v.
Phillips, 77 Wash. 2d 879, 468 P.2d 444 (1970).
43. Brunswick Corp. v. J & P, Inc., 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970); Adams v. Egley,
338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal.), appeal docketed, No. 72-1484 (9th Cir. - 1972); Laprease
v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970); Blair v. Pitchess, 5
Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971); Cedar Rapids Eng'r. Co. v.
Haenelt, 68 Misc. 2d 206, 326 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct. 1971); Lawson v. Mantell, 62
Misc. 2d 307, 306 N.Y.S.2d 317 (Sup. Ct. 1969). Of the above cases, Adams, Laprease
and Blair applied Sniadach to replevin proceedings. See also Randone v. Appellate
Dept., 5 Cal. 3d 356, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971).
44. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Serritella v. Engelman, 339 F. Supp. 738
(D.N.J. 1972); Hunt v. Edmonds, 328 F. Supp. 468 (D. Minn. 1971); Goliday v. Rob-
inson, 305 F. Supp. 1224 (N.D. II. 1969).
45. Collins v. Viceroy Hotel Corp., 338 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. IMI. 1972); Holt v.
Brown, 336 F. Supp. 2 (W.D. Ky. 1971); Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D.
Pa. 1970); Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
46. Brunswick Corp. v. J & P, Inc., 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970); Epps v. Cortese,
326 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Termplan, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 105 Ariz. 270, 463
P.2d 68 (1969); Arnold v. Knettle, 10 Ariz. App. 509, 460 P.2d 45 (1969); McCallop v.
Carberry, 1 Cal. 3d 903, 464 P.2d 122, 83 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1970); Mills v. Bartlett, 265
A.2d 39 (Del. Super. 1970); Cedar Rapids Eng. Co. v. Haenelt, 68 Misc. 2d 206, 326
N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct. 1971); Lawson v. Mantel, 62 Misc. 2d 307, 306 N.Y.S.2d 317
(Sup. Ct. 1969).
47. Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal.), appeal docketed, No. 72-1484
(9th Cir. - 1972); Collins v. Viceroy Hotel Corp., 338 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Ill.
1972); Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Laprease v. Raymours
Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970); Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109
(N.D. Cal. 1970); Goliday v. Robinson, 305 F. Supp. 1224 (N.D. IMI. 1969); Jones
Press, Inc. v. Motor Travel Services, Inc., 176 N.W.2d 87 (Minn. 1970).
48. See note 41 supra.
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In Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.,49 Mrs. Lynch brought suit
in a Connecticut district court under section 1983, charging that the
defendant's prejudgment garnishment of her bank account was violative
of due process under Sniadach. In reversing the district court's conclu-
sion that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, the Supreme Court
swept away a 72-year-old barrier by saying: "This Court has never
adopted the distinction between personal liberties and proprietary rights
as a guide to the contours of 1343 (3) jurisdiction.50 Today we expressly
reject that distinction." ra The specter of Hague was gone. Section
1983 had reached its full potential, and its utility for an unconstitution-
ally-deprived debtor had been maximized.
The decision in Fuentes v. Shevin 2 can be viewed as an expansion and
clarification of Sniadach. Fuentes resolved a lingering lower court con-
flict, holding broadly that the right to notice and a hearing before gar-
nishment was not limited to wages. Since the due process clause forbids
the deprivation of any property without the protections of constitution-
ally-mandated procedure, "it is not the business of a court adjudicating
due process rights to make its own critical evaluation.., and protect only
[that property which], by its own lights, [is] 'necessary'." 53 The
Florida and Pennsylvania prejudgment replevin statutes were thus held
unconstitutional. Moreover, the conclusion was inescapable that, except
in extraordinary situations, any prejudgment seizure of a debtor's prop-
erty would be violative of due process unless he was afforded notice and
an opportunity to be heard. It is true that some exceptions to notice and
hearing remained, but it was equally true that, in the ordinary situa-
tion, "damages may... be awarded.., for the wrongful deprivation." "
In sum, the Supreme Court has developed the 1871 Civil Rights Act
to such an extent that, as far as the debtor is concerned, section 1983
is useful to him today as follows:
1) Except in a limited number of circumstances, prejudgment
seizures of property are violative of due process of law.,
2) If a debtor is deprived of his property in this manner, he may
seek redress in a federal court.
49. 92 S. Ct. 1113 (1972).
50. See note 5 supra (footnote supplied).
51. 92 S. Ct. at 1117.
52. 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972).
5&4 Id. at 1999.
54. Id. at 1995.
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3) If the creditor, who is presumed to know the law, wrong-
fully deprives a debtor of his property pursuant to a state statute,
he is acting under "color of state law."
4) The debtor may obtain damages or injunctive relief for the
wrongful deprivation.
If there were nothing more to be considered, a debtor's action for a
wrongful taking would, indeed, be simple. But despite the broad lati-
tude the Supreme Court has afforded the debtor, there are a number
of other obstacles that must be overcome before there can be any as-
surance that such a suit will be successful. These issues are the subject
of the remainder of this Note, and involve: private repossession, 5
creditors' defenses,58 waiver of due process, 57 injunctive relief,5 the
federal anti-injunction statute,59 damages which can be recovered,6° and
retroactive application of the Sniadach-Lynch-Fuentes evolvement of
section 1983.61
STATE ACTION AND DUE PROCESS
The primary element for successful recovery against a wrongdoing
creditor is, of course, a statutorily-maintainable cause of action. The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit a defendant to move for dis-
missal on the pleadings if the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. 2 The debtor's complaint, therefore, must
comply precisely with the elements of a section 1983 cause of action
if he is to do more than visit the courtroom.'" As has been discussed
above, section 1983 requires that the plaintiff be 1) deprived of a con-
stitutional right, 2) under color of state law.6 A debtor suing for a
55. See notes 94-103 infra & accompanying text.
56. See notes 104-78 infra & accompanying text.
57. See notes 139-40 infra & accompanying text.
58. See notes 179-98 infra & accompanying text.
59. See notes 182-98 infra & accompanying text.
60. See notes 199-249 infra & accompanying text.
61. See note 240 infra & accompanying text.
62. FED. R. Crv. P. 12 (b) (6).
63. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that the complaint contain a short
statement of jurisdictional grounds, a short and plain statement of the claim, and a
demand for judgment. Fmn. R. Civ. P. 8(a). A section 1983 claim must set forth
the jurisdiction as established by section 1343(3), a prayer for injunctive or monetary
relief or both, and, most importantly, a deprivation of a constitutional right under
color of state law. The averment of deprivation under color of state law is the
subject of this discussion.
64. "Color of state law" is the catch-all for the statutory phrase "under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage. . . " 42 U.S.C. S 1983 (1970).
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wrongful seizure presumably has no problem satisfying the first require-
ment-Sniadach and Fuentes say that a prejudgment taking of property
without notice and without a hearing violates due process of law, and
Lynch holds that proprietary due process violations are cognizable
under section 1983. The second element of a section 1983 action-that
the deprivation be made under color of state law-poses more serious
problems.
As will be recalled, the generally accepted definition of "color of
state law" was announced by Justice Stone in United States v. Classic:m5
"Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible
only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.
... 7"6 Justice Douglas in Screws v. United States67 clarified a distinction
that previously had been drawn between state law and authority of state
law: "[A]cts of officers in the ambit of their personal pursuits are
plainly excluded [from the definition]. Acts of officers who undertake
to perform their official duties are included whether they hew to the
line of their authority or overstep it." 68 Since the common law had
established that any agent or officer of the state acts for the state itself,
there was "state action" so long as the officer was acting within the
scope of his duty. If, while performing the duties of his office, he
deprived another of a constitutional right, there was a valid claim against
him under the fourteenth amendment and its statutory counterparts. 9
Cases subsequent to Classic and Screws further refined this definition
of "color of law" until it became indistinguishable from the related
concept of "state action." 7o United States v. Price,71 for instance, held
that one need not be a state official to be acting under color of state
65. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
66. Id. at 326.
67. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
68. Id. at 111.
69. Compare Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965) with Watkins v. Oaldawn
Jockey Club, 86 F. Supp. 1006 (W.D. Ark. 1949).
Previously, there had been a split of authority on the question whether acting "under
color of law" included action taken pursuant to an invalid statute or improper action
pursuant to a valid statutory scheme. Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S.
278 (1913), and Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879), settled the debate, concluding
that both kinds of action were actions "under color of law." See Alfange, Under
Color of Law: Classic and Screws Revisited, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 395, 400-04 (1962).
70. See, e.g., Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970). For some historical
and policy reasons why the two concepts should not be distinguished, see Note,
Section 1983: A Civil Remedy for the Protection of Federal Rights, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rav.
839, 843 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Civil Remedy].
71. 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
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law. A private individual wilfully participating in an activity with the
state or its agents could be said to have acted under color of state law.
Inasmuch as the classic definition of "color of law" assumed that the
defendant would be a state official, cases such as Price all but obliterated
the distinction.7 2
Assuming, then, that only state action 3 serves to validate a section
1983 claim, it is necessary to define that term within the meaning of
the Act. All the definitions the courts have proffered have arisen in
the context of particular fact situations, and the concept varies with
the circumstances in which it is raised.
Clearly, an official performing an authorized act within the scope of
his duties is acting under color of state law, and state action is involved.
This includes the court clerk issuing a writ, the sheriff repossessing col-
lateral, or the judge entering an order confessing judgment. In the
absence of immunity, 4 these individuals could be sued under section
1983 if their actions are unconstitutional vis-a-vis the plaintiff. However,
most of the questions arise when the activities are performed by private
persons, and when phrased in the context of the thesis of this Note, the
crucial inquiry is whether a debtor can sue his creditor, who normally
is not a state official. The courts have helped formulate some answers.
The most noted case to deal with the question of state action is Shelley
v. Kraemer,5 where a Negro purchased a house in Kraemer's neighbor-
hood. Kraemer sued to force the seller to abide by the terms of a re-
72. See also Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964); Hampton v. Jaclsonville, 304 F.2d 320 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. Ghioto v. Hampton, 371 U.S. 911 (1962); Boman v. Birmingham
Transit Co., 280 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960); Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149
F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945).
73. This term hereinafter will be used interchangeably with "color of law."
A definition of the term "state action" was the subject of a recent Supreme Court
decision. In District of Columbia v. Carter, 93 S. Ct. 602, 610 (1973), the Court held
that the defendant-in-error did not have a section 1983 cause of action against several
District policemen who allegedly had arrested him without probable cause and used
excessive force. Extensively analyzing the history of section 1983, the Court concluded
that "[ulnlike either the States or Territories, the District is truly sui generis in our
governmental structure." Since it saw section 1983 as evolving from the need for fed-
eral court jurisdiction over the unconstitutional activities of state officials, and since it
noted that before 1871 the District already had such jurisdiction, the Court refused to
extend the purview of the statute to a resident of the District of Columbia. Although
the Court stated that Carter was not without a remedy, in light of the wide applica-
tion that section 1983 has been given in numerous contexts, it would seem that resi-
dents of the District are to be the victims of an overly-strict interpretation.
74. See notes 104-38 infra & acompanying text.
75. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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strictive covenant prohibiting the sale of homes to Blacks. Since a long
line of precedents had established that mere voluntary private discrim-
ination was not a constitutional wrong, the lower court refused to take
cognizance of Shelley's equal protection allegation; the necessary state
action for a fourteenth amendment violation was absent. Although
the Supreme Court reaffirmed the legality of purely private discrim-
ination, it held that Shelley had a valid constitutional claim, since
the state court previously had interpreted the covenant to allow dis-
crimination, thereby sanctioning its content. After Shelley, state action
logically might be inferred from judicial sanction of any private con-
duct. But the enduring gloss of Hague has survived Lynch, and the
lower courts have not been consistent in applying state action concepts
where the conduct involves mere property rights unrelated to racial
discrimination.
In addition to finding state action from judicial decisions, the Su-
preme Court has drawn a similar inference when a state constitution
sanctions or encourages conduct violative of the United States Consti-
tution. In Reitman v. Mulkey,77 the state of California amended its
constitution to allow private discrimination by property owners. Since
a state statute previously had prohibited such discrimination, adoption
of the amendment was seen as state encouragement of unconstitutional
activity, thus bringing the conduct within the ambit of the fourteenth
amendment.
In terms of consistency of application, perhaps the most difficult con-
text in which state action concepts have been examined occurs when
the conduct involved has been authorized by common law, custom or
usage, or other "generally understood practice of ancient and honorable
lineage." 78 The Supreme Court addressed this situation in Adickes v.
S. H. Kress & Co.,79 when it held that state action existed where dis-
criminatory customs which had no statutory or constitutional basis were
enforced by local police officers. Regrettably, the Court's movement
away from insistence on statutory or constitutional involvement as a
76. Compare Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (SD. Cal. 1972), appeal docketed, No.
72-1484 (9th Cir. 1972) 'with Oiler v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal.
1972) and Messenger v. Sandy Motors Inc, 121 NJ. Super. 1, 295 A.2d 402 (1972).
77. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
78. Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 121 N.J. Super 1, 295 A.2d 402, 406 (1972)
quoting from amicus curiae brief filed by Professor Mentschikoff in the litigation on
appeal to the Ninth Circuit in Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (SD. Cal. 1972),
appeal docketed, No. 72-1484 (9th Cir. - 1972).
79. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
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prerequisite to a finding of state action has been interpreted too re-
strictively by several lower courts. In rejecting state action claims based
on common law or custom, several courts80 have found the rationale
of Adickes to be inapplicable. It is submitted, however, that these courts
overlook the teachings of Shelley v. Kraemer, where the Court stated
clearly that "State action, as that phrase is understood for the purposes
of the Fourteenth Amendment, refers to exertions of state power in all
forms," 81 and that "action is not immunized from the operation of
the Fourteenth Amendment simply because it is taken pursuant to the
state's common-law policy." 82 The lower courts attempted to dis-
tinguish Shelley and Adickes on the ground that these cases involved
racial discrimination. Mere deprivation of property rights, they reason,
is not sufficient to trigger the Adickes-Shelley extension of the state
action concept. It is submitted, however, that in view of Lynch, this
distinction has become attenuated. Thus, a proper reading of Shelley,
Adickes, and Lynch suggests that prejudgment seizure cannot be dis-
missed from state action considerations merely because such seizure is
made pursuant to custom or common law rather than statutory or con-
stitutional provisions.
Still another issue regarding state action is whether conduct on the
part of a person, not a government official, will entail state involvement
sufficient to raise a fourteenth amendment question. In Hall v. Garson,8
a landlord, in accordance with local statutory lien provisions, entered
a tenant's room and seized the tenant's television set as compensation
for rent due. In deciding for the plaintiff, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held such conduct to be state action. While the landlord
had no connection whatsoever with the state, her entry and seizure were
said to have been acts which had the characteristics of actions typically
performed by state officials.84
80. See cases cited note 76 supra.
81. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948).
82. Id.
83. 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972), reaff'g 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970). See also Collins
v. Viceroy Hotel Corp., 338 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. I1. 1972).
84. This rationale presents what is called the "public function theory." It similarly
was adopted in United States v. Wiseman, 445 F.2d 792 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 967 (1971). In Wisenan, the defendants were professional process servers employed
by a private organization. Instead of serving the summonses upon the named parties
at their ghetto residences, the defendants threw them into the sewer and falsely swore
to service. The supposedly-served parties, meanwhile, had default judgments entered
[Vol. 14:627
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Thus, what once was a rather narrowly construed concept of "color
of state law" has been transformed into the multifarious concept of
state action. Included is judicial, legislative, or common law sanction;
compulsion via custom; and actions which are characterized as func-
tions of the state. These factors converge to provide substantial support
for many claims based on section 1983. s6 Thus, when the circumstances
of a particular unconstitutional deprivation or seizure of property coexist
with one of these categories of state action, a successful complaint
should be possible. Even under expanded notions of state action, how-
ever, substantial difficulty might continue to be encountered in showing
state involvement in the seizure. Discussion of this problem follows.
Seizure Involving State Officials
Satisfying Due Process: No Liability
Before determining which of the creditors' remedies can be found
to encompass unconstitutional state action, an assessment must be made
of those which cannot. The guiding principle of Sniadach and Fuentes
was that prejudgment garnishment, attachment,8 6 or replevin, without
notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard, are violative of due
against them. The court held that since the defendants were performing what is
ordinarily a public function, any claim against them was maintainable under the due
process clause. Accord, United States v. Barr, 295 F. Supp. 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
85. A recent state action case, Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 92 S. Ct. 1965 (1972), demon-
strates how the state can become an unwitting party to private action. The defendant-
in-error sued the lodge under the equal protection clause for refusing to serve him
because he was black. Irvis' allegation of state action grew from the fact that the
Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board regulated all local licensees, including the Moose
Lodge. Such regulation was held insufficient to support a finding of state action. The
Court did, however, find state action in the fact that a state statute compelled the
board to require its licensees to adhere to their respective constitutions and by-laws.
Since Moose Lodge's charter compelled racial discrimination, it had deprived Irvis of
equal protection under color of state law. See also Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
86. Attachment in this sense is used synonymously with garnishment where a distinc-
tion is made between the two procedures. Technically, garnishment is a levy upon
property belonging to the debtor but in the hands of a third person, or upon a debt
owed to the debtor by a third person, the garnishee. Attachment, on the other hand,
is a levy upon property which the debtor owns and has in his possession. The latter
should be distinguished from foreign attachment, discussed in note 89 infra & accom-
panying text. Whether it is called garnishment or attachment, the applicable constitu-
tional principles afford a parallel result. See Randone v. Appellate Dept., 5 Cal. 3d 356,
488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971).
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process of law.87 The rationale of this premise is that every person
is entided to a hearing before being deprived of his property. The
obvious result of this rule is that prejudgment seizures which occur
after notice is given and after a hearing is provided, as well as
post-judgment seizures,88 are not violative of the Constitution. The ques-
tion of state action is, of course, irrelevant if the creditor's claim has
been heard and the debtor's defenses have been asserted in a proceeding
which has provided a fair hearing of the disputed claims. Due process
will have been fulfilled and there is no constitutional violation upon
which to base a complaint under section 1983.
A third procedure arguably beyond objection is foreign attachment,
where the debtor is a resident of a state other than that in which his
creditor lives, and the creditor executes upon in-state property belonging
to the debtor and prosecutes his claim only after the property is in the
custody of the court. In such situations, the debtor often cannot be
notified, and a viable justification for dispensing with procedural due
process may be presented. The court's inquiry in such a case should not,
however, be limited to whether the debtor is absent from the forum
state. Several opinions have indicated that where in personam jurisdic-
87. Some courts have held prejudgment replevin unconstitutional on yet another
ground, that of unreasonable search and seizure. Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486
P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971), held, for example, that California's claim and
delivery (replevin) law violated the fourth amendment in that the issuance of the writ
to the sheriff was merely ministerial, without prior determination as to the probable
cause of the creditor's right to the property. The California court also rejected the
argument that the debtor waived his rights by admitting the sheriff into his home,
concluding that the debtor was precluded from denying entry to a man who repre-
sented the "intimidating presence of the law." Finally, the court said that the public
interest in promoting commerce or extending credit was not sufficient to forgo the
fourth amendment requirement of a search warrant. Accord, Laprease v. Raymours
Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
For a discussion of Blair, Randone, and Sniadach, see Ordin, Sumnary Creditor
Remedies: A Thing of the Past?, 47 L.A. BAR BuLL. 230 (1971).
88. Although a section 1983 suit would not lie following a postjudgment seizure, the
debtor could file suit in a state court alleging unconscionability of the sales contract.
UNoaM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302. See Kosches v. Nichols, 10 UCC REP. SERV. 147
(1971). Garnishment and replevin are provisional remedies, the benefit of which lies.
in the avoidance of an expensive and time-consuming adversary adjudication. Since
lack of notice and a hearing were the precise elements prejudgment seizures were
designed to circumvent, once the creditor is forced to appear in court, there is no
need for him to garnish or replevy-he will have his claim validated or invalidated
and, in the former case, can. merely execute the judgment. It follows that, except
where judgment is by default, summary creditor remedies have been all but eliminated.
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tion is readily obtainable, special protection of a state or creditor interest
does not justify dispensing with the constitutional requirements of
notice and hearing, even though the debtor resides in a foreign state.8 9
The Fuentes decision suggests circumstances in addition to foreign
attachment where notice and a hearing may be unnecessary:
There are "extraordinary situations" that justify postponing
notice and opportunity for a hearing. These situations, however,
must be truly unusual. Only in a few limited situations has this
Court allowed outright seizure without opportunity for a prior
hearing. First, in each case, the seizure has been directly necessary
to secure an important governmental or general public interest.
Second, there has been a special need for very prompt action.
Third, the State has kept strict control over its monopoly of legi-
timate force: the person initiating the seizure has been a govern-
mental official responsible for determining, under the standards of
a narrowly-drawn statute, that it was necessary and justified in the
particular instance.90
It is not entirely clear from this language whether all three require-
ments must coalesce before the "extraordinary circumstances" exception
arises. A review of the cases cited by the court, however, indicates
that all three factors were present in each case.91 Thus, the possibility
that a creditor will succeed in an argument that the circumstances of
his case fall within the "extraordinary" category are at best speculative;
the specific statute and judicial attitude of the respective jurisdiction
should be consulted and, if a debtor's property is seized summarily on
a ground which fails to fit the policies elucidated by the courts, a sec-
89. An inference can be drawn that the Court in Sniadacb v. Family Fin. Corp., 395
U.S. 337 (1969), was making precisely this determination. Justice Douglas stated:
But in the present case no situation requiring special protection to a state
or creditor interest is presented by the facts.... Petitioner was a resident of
this Wisconsin community and in personam jurisdiction was readily obtain-
able.
Id. at 339. See Tucker v. Burton, 319 F. Supp. 567 (D.D.C. 1970). But see Mills Y.
Bartlett, 265 A.2d 39 (Del. Super. 1970). For an expanded discussion of the foreign
attachment exception see Due Process Revisited, supra note 35, at 346.
90. 92 S. Ct. at 1999-2000 (footnotes omitted).
91. See Due Process Revisited, supra note 35 at 344.
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tion 1983 complaint would not be without merit.2 This is especiallytrue in view of the liberal trend being evidenced in the federal courts. 3
Unconstitutional Deprivation: Liability
Assuming arguendo that "extraordinary circumstances" are not per-
tinent and that due process has been violated, it is necessary to
return to the problem orginally raised-what actions of the creditor are
to be considered state action? Two types of seizures must be considered.
The first involves a seizure pursuant to a prejudgment garnishment, at-
tachment, or replevin statute which does not require notice or a hear-
ing and which does not set forth narrowly drawn circumstances in
which such a seizure is permitted. In this situation, the state usually
is an active party (in garnishment and attachment via a judically-issued
writ and in replevin by a sheriff's seizure). Thus, both elements of a
section 1983 allegation, state action and unconstitutional infringement,
are present. The second type of seizure, private repossession, presents a
more perplexing problem.
Section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides:
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right
to take possession of the collateral. In taking possession a se-
cured party may proceed ewithout judicial process if this can be
done without a breach of the peace or may proceed by action.9 4
It is important to note that two requirements are essential to private
repossession: The creditor must be a secured party and the debtor must
be in default. Since most consumer credit sales are made under install-
ment plans, the creditor normally retains a security interest in the mer-
chandise and will take the steps required to assure his status as a secured
party. The second question, whether there actually has been a default,
92. In Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 277, 486 P.2d 1242, 1256, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 56
(1971), for example, the Supreme Court of California found that the asserted need for
promptness because of the likelihood that the debtor would abscond with the prop-
erty was not sufficient justification for eliminating due process requirements. But cf.
Young v. Ridley, 309 F. Supp. 1308 (D.D.C. 1970). See generally Clark, Default, Re-
possession, Foreclosure, and Deficiency: A Journey to the Underworld and a Proposed
Salvation, 51 ORE. L. Rrv. 302, 340 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Clark]; Smith, Sniadacb
and Summary Procedures: The Constitution Comes to the Marketplace, 5 Im. L.F.
300 (1972).
93. See cases cited note 41 supra.
94. UrNEoRM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-503 (emphasis supplied).
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is at the core of most self-help seizures; in most instances, however,
the issue is determined unilaterally by the creditor, and due process re-
quirements are bypassed. The question arises whether Code section 9-503
is unconstitutional state action within the parameters of Fuentes, and,
if so, whether insertion of similar terms in the installment contract will
ameliorate its taint. As discussed above, several lower courts have con-
fronted this important issue.
"Private" Repossession-Is the State a Party?
Two California federal district courts have reached opposite con-
clusions concerning the effect of a contractual adoption of section 9-503
terms. Both Adams v. Egley9 5 and Oiler v. Bank of America 6 dealt
with installment sales contracts which contained a provision permitting
private repossession upon default. It is submitted at the outset that, based
upon the long-standing precedents regarding "color of law" which have
proliferated since Shelley v. Kraemer,9 7 the self-help section of the
Code, absent a contractual inclusion, will constitute state action. Indeed,
it is a state statute sanctioning the very practices prohibited by Fuentes,
and if a creditor merely follows the encouragement of section 9-503,
a section 1983 suit may succeed under the due process clause. 8 Adams
and Oiler, however, reach opposite conclusions when the terms of sec-
tion 9-503 are inserted in an installment sales contract.
In Adams, (a pre-Fuentes decision which presaged the rationale
espoused in Fuentes) the court found that section 9-503 was state sanc-
tion of an unconstitutional taking and that its insertion into a contract
did not change its character. The Code, in essence, inspired Egley to
provide for private repossession in the agreement: "[I]n drawing up
the agreements defendant creditors were persuaded or induced to in-
clude repossession by the fact that such repossession was permitted by
the statute." 9 Oiler, on the other hand, found neither the Code nor
a contractual adoption of it to involve state action. The court reasoned
that repossession was a well established common law remedy which had
95. 338 F. Supp. 614 (SD. Cal.), appeal docketed, No. 72-1484 (9th Cir. 1972). This
case was consolidated with Posadas v. Star & Crescent Fed. Credit Union.
96. 342 F. Supp. 21 (ND. Cal. 1972).
97. 334 US. 1 (1948). See note 75 supra & accompanying text.
98. One author has argued that even if private repossession should be found not to
be encouraged by the state, there is state action in the issuance of deficiency judgments
which follow most repossessions. Clark, supra note 92, at 329. See note 102 infra.
99. 338 F. Supp. at 617.
19731
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been approved judicially before the enactment of the UCC °° It also dis-
tinguished Adams by discounting its reliance on Reitman v. Mulkey.
Concepts of state action as applied in the civil rights context were not felt
to be relevant in property rights cases.1 " The Supreme Court has yet
to decide the question, but, as noted above, it would seem that despite
the fact that repossession existed before the Commercial Code sanc-
tioned it, it cannot stand in the face of Fuentes, Kraemer, and Adickes;
the right to due process is no less sacred because the goods are seized by
a man without a badge, °2 and the distinction drawn in Oiler between
civil rights and property rights may be untenable after Lynch. 03 In-
deed, perhaps Adams' reliance upon Reitman v. Mulkey was misplaced.
Instead, Adams should have relied on the more compelling logic of
Shelley and Adickes.
100. 342 F. Supp. at 23.
101. Another question which arises from contractual private repossession is whether
the debtor has waived his due process rights simply through the execution of the
agreement. Due process rights can be waived by contract, but it is likely that in
consumer retail installment agreements the disparity of bargaining power is so great
that waiver would be disfavored. See notes 139-140 infra & accompanying text.
102. A recent case dealing with similar facts is Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 121
NJ. Super. 1, 295 A.2d 402 (1972). The court followed Oiler in upholding the con-
stitutionality of self-help, resting its decision on the prior legal recognition of re-
possession, the difficulty of altering the nation's credit system to conform to the
Adams requirements, and the recognition that automobile buyers are "well informed"
of the likelihood of repossession if they do not pay. It concluded by taking judicial
notice of the studies that have been made of. section 9-503 and its consequent lack
of change. Accord, Greene v. First Nat'l Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va. 1972). See
also McCormick v. First Nat'l Bank, 322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
It is submitted that the distinction between prejudgment replevin and self-help will
be ephemeral. As noted in the text, Shelley, Fuentes, and Adickes seem to compel
a different result. Moreover, the mere fact that the courts had sanctioned private
repossession before the adoption of the Code does not make fundamental constitutional
safeguards any less necessary. Thus, the conclusion is inescapable that such wide-
spread judicial sanction involves state action and therefore necessitates a holding that
self-help is unconstitutional. Since the application of notice and hearing requirements
to private repossession will require a major overhaul in credit selling practices, Mes-
senger, Greene, Oiler, and McCormick probably presage a Supreme Court determina-
tion of the self-help question. However, in light of the fact that self-help reaches beyond
car buying, affects the great majority of low-income consumers who buy on credit,
and is, after all, a deprivation of property without due process of law, the Fuentes ra-
tionale presumably would justify a similar result when the Court examines section
9-503.
103. See text accompanying notes 49-51 supra.
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DEFENSES
Although the debtor may be able to surpass the state action hurdle
and establish a constitutional claim utilizing section 1983, there are
numerous defenses, such as the defendant's immunity, waiver by the
debtor, the statute of limitations, specific intent, and survival of the
action, which must be overcome.
Immunity
Section 1983 provides that every person who deprives a United States
citizen of a constitutional right under color of state law shall be liable
to the injured party. A literal reading of the statute would suggest that
the doctrine of official immunity could not be raised as a defense in a
section 1983 claim for damages.104 The first time the question was
raised, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit came to precisely
that conclusion. In Picking v. Pennsylvania R. R.,105 the court held
the doctrine of official immunity inapplicable as a defense to protect the
governor of Pennsylvania and a justice of the peace who had extradited
the plaintiff without due process of law. However, six years later the
Supreme Court in Tenney v. Brandhove'0 6 held that Congress could
not have intended the Civil Rights Act to have such an unqualified
interpretation and allowed the California Senate Committee on Un-
American Activities to assert immunity as a defense. Although the case
dealt only with legislative immunity, the door was opened thereby and
the defense was soon extended to other officials. 07 It is now well estab-
lished that the common law doctrine of official immunity is available
as a defense to a section 1983 suit.
10 8
Under the common law, the immunity afforded judges, legislators
and high ranking executives was absolute, but lower ranking adminis-
trative officials were granted immunity only if their acts were discre-
104. See notes 105-38 infra & accompanying text.
105. 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 776 (1947).
106. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
107. Nelson v. Knox, 256 F.2d 312 (6th Cir. 1958); Cuikas v. City of Mansfield, 250
F.2d 700 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 937 (1958); Tate v. Arnold, 223 F.2d
782 (8th Cir. 1955); Cawley v. Warren, 216 F.2d 74 (7th Cir. 1954); Francis v. Crafts,
203 F.2d 809 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 835 (1953); Cobb v. City of Malden,
202 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1953); McGuire v. Todd, 198 F.2d 60 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 835 (1952); Comment, The Defense of "Good Faith" Under Section 1983,
1971 WAsH. UL.Q. 666, 667.
108. E.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367
(1951).
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tionary, as opposed to ministerial. In addition, lower ranking officers
could not claim immunity unless they were acting in good faith.'09
An analysis of the immunity doctrine in the context of the debtor-
creditor relationship is necessary to clarify the policy considerations
underlying the doctrine and its limitations. There are potentially four
party-defendants to whom an aggrieved debtor may look for recovery:
The sheriff who replevies or levies upon the debtor's property, the court
clerk who issues the writ, the creditor's lawyer, or the creditor and his
collection agents. Due to the fact that immunity would preclude recov-
ery against any of these parties, separate consideration of each relation-
ship is essential.
The Creditor's Lack of Immunity
The doctrine of immunity traditionally has been employed for the
purpose of promoting the "fearless and impartial" execution of duty
by officials charged with the responsibility of making judicial, legisla-
tive, or executive policy decisions. 01 Since this policy would not be
served by invoking immunity on behalf of the creditor, the doctrine
clearly is inapplicable to him.
The Sheriff
State law enforcement officers have been frequent targets of section
1983 suits,-"' and there is little doubt that their actions are "under color
of" state law. In Monroe v. Pape,"2 it will be recalled, the Supreme
Court held that certain Chicago policemen were subject to a claim for
damages under section 1983. Although the policemen did not rely on
immunity, some courts concluded that the Supreme Court had abro-
gated the defense as it applied to section 1983 actions."13 The Court laid
109. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 132 (4th ed. 1971); Jennings, Tort Liability of
Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. REv. 263 (1937); Keefe, Personal Tort Liability
of Administrative Officials, 12 FORDHAM L. REV. 130 (1943); Comment, The Defense of
"Good Faith" Under Section 19853, 1971 WASH. U.L.Q. 666, 667.
110. In Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967), the Supreme Court stated that it
is in the public's best interest that judges should be allowed the freedom necessary
to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences. This
was a reaffimation of Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871). For further
discussion of the rationale underlying official immunity see W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS
§ 132 (4th ed. 1971); Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 MiNN.
L. REv. 263 (1937); Federal Comity, supra note 10, at 751.
111. Federal Comity, supra note 10, at 797.
112. 365 U.S. 167 (1960).
113. E.g., Cohen v. Norris, 300 F.2d 24, 33 (9th Cir. 1962); Federal Conity, supra note
10, at 800 n.266.
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to rest all speculation in Pierson v. Ray,114 when it held that section
1983 did not deprive policemen of their common law tort immunity."5
The immunity to be enjoyed by police officers is not unqualified, how-
ever; it can only be claimed if the officer has acted in good faith and
with probable cause."""
Although this standard is applied to police officers making arrests, it
is probable that a sheriff carrying out a seizure writ successfully could
claim good faith and probable cause," 7 although such a claim normally
would be unnecessary. It is more likely that an officer executing an
order which is fair on its face, and which was issued from a court of
proper jurisdiction, will be able to rely on the propriety of the order;
he will not be held liable unless he acts beyond his authority."8 Thus,
in the vast majority of section 1983 actions brought by debtors, the
sheriff executing a writ should be immune from suit." 9 There could
be, however, several exceptions to this general rule. In states which have
garnishment statutes similar to Connecticut's, 20 the sheriff may lose his
traditional immunity. In Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., the Su-
preme Court held that the sheriff who levied a garnishment was not
acting as an agent of the court; rather, he was said to have been an
agent of the creditor and the creditor's attorney.' 2' Undoubtedly, this
seemingly artificial distinction would make it difficult for the sheriff to
claim immunity, but statutes allowing garnishment without the par-
ticipation of a judge or clerk are relatively uncommon. 22
Another exception to the general rule of immunity may have a more
profound effect upon a sheriff's potential liability. Often, state pre-
judgment seizure statutes permit the sheriff to enter the debtor's house
114. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
115. Id. at 555.
116. Id. at 557. For a discussion of the problems and ambiguities associated with this
test see Federal Cmnity, supra note 10, at 804 n.290.
117. This is undoubtedly true prior to a judicial holding that the applicable statute is
unconstitutional. K. DAvis, ADMinisTRATIVE LAW TExT § 26.05 (3rd ed. 1972); W. PRos-
SER, LAW OF TORTS§ 25 (4th ed. 1971).
118. W. PRossER, LAW OF TORTS § 25 (4th ed. 1971); Federal Comity, supra note 10,
at 802-03.
119. In the pre-Sniadacb case of Thompson v. Baker, 133 F. Supp. 247 (WD. Ark.
1955), a district court held that a constable carrying out a writ of garnishment which
allegedly had been issued without evidence of a valid claim and without the required
bond was still protected from a section 1983 action provided the writ was valid on
its face.
120. CoNN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 52-329 (1958).
121. 92 S. Ct. 1113, 1123 (1972).
122. Id.
1973]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:627
and seize the collateral, without first seeking the permission of the
debtor.'3 A potential fourth amendment search and seizure violation
lurks in such a procedure. Indeed, pleas for relief based upon fourth
amendment grounds have been successful in lower federal courts, 124 and
appear to be logically compelled from the Sniadach-Fuentes due process
rationale. Whether the sheriff's immunity will survive in an action
against him for damages for an unconstitutional seizure in violation of
the fourth amendment is problematic. 125
The Clerk of the Court
Judges quite clearly are accorded absolute immunity for their judicial
acts within the jurisdiction of their court. 126 This is true even where
the conduct is corrupt or malicious and intended to do injury. 27 The
Supreme Court in Pierson v. Ray 28 unequivocally held that judicial
immunity is available as a defense in a section 1983 action. 29 Judges
generally are not involved in a prejudgment replevin, attachment, or
garnishment proceeding, and as illustrated by Fuentes, the clerk of the
court usually issues the writ. 30
Whether the judge's absolute immunity should be extended to include
the clerk's activities, or whether the clerk should be protected only when
acting pursuant to a judicial order, is not clear.'' A lucid analysis of
123. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. Pao. CODE § 517 (West 1954).
124. See, e.g., Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971),
discussed in note 87 supra.
125. See notes 117-18 supra & accompanying text.
126. E.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 335 (1871); Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
US. 1021 (1967); Gabbard v. Rose, 359 F.2d 182 (6th Cir. 1966); Haldane v. Chagnon,
345 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1965); Arnold v. Bostick, 339 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 858 (1965); Harman v. Superior Ct., 329 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1964);
Sires v. Cole, 320 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1963); Gately v. Sutton, 310 F.2d 107 (10th Cir.
1962); Meredith v. Van Oosterhout, 286 F.2d 216 (8th Cir. 1960); Rhodes v. Houston,
202 F. Supp. 624 (D. Neb.), aff'd, 309 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S.
909 (1963).
Immunity applies only to actions for damages; it does not apply to actions seeking
injunctive relief. See, e.g., Cassidy v. Ceci, 320 F. Supp. 223, 228 (E.D. Wis. 1970); Stam-
bler v. Dillon, 288 F. Supp. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
127. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
128. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
129. Id.
130. 92 S. Ct. 1983, 1990-92 (1972).
131. Davis v. McAteer, 431 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir. 1970); Dieu v. Norton, 411 F.2d
761, 763 (7th Cir. 1969); Stewart v. Minnick, 409 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1969) (per curiam);
Brown v. Dunne, 409 F.2d 341, 343 (7th Cir. 1969); Steinpreis v. Shook, 377 F.2d 282,
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this problem was made in MeCray v. State. 22 A Maryland prisoner
sought section 1983 relief against a court clerk who allegedly had im-
peded the filing of the prisoner's petition for post-conviction relief. In
answer to the question whether the judge's absolute immunity should
be extended to a court clerk, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
said:
[I]n determining whether the protection afforded by the doctrine
of absolute immunity is to be expanded to lesser judicial personnel,
it is imperative always to bear in mind the reasons underlying the
creation of the immunity shield. 'The proper approach is to con-
sider the precise function at issue, and determine whether the
officer is likely to be unduly inhibited in the performance of that
function by the threat of liability for tortious conduct.' The priv-
ilege of absolute judicial immunity should be 'applied sparingly'
in suits brought under section 1983 since to give too wide a scope
of protection to state officials would effect a 'judicial repeal' of the
congressional purpose .... 133
The court held that although the clerk's duty is associated with the
court system, it is ministerial rather than quasi-judicial or discretionary
in nature. Under the common law, a state officer failing to perform
a ministerial act was not granted immunity.134 The court felt that the
threat of possible tort liability in these circumstances would not "unduly
inhibit" the clerk in the discharge of his duties; thus, there was no
compelling reason to invoke the doctrine. It was acknowledged, how-
ever, that a clerk acting pursuant to his lawful authority or following
an order of the court still would be protected. 35
The court's conclusion that a clerk should not be granted absolute
immunity, along with its cogent supporting rationale, could have an
important impact on the debtor-creditor situation. Certainly the issuance
of a writ is no less ministerial than the filing of a petition. It is equally
283 (4th Cir. 1967); Rhodes v. Meyer, 334 F.2d 709, 718 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 915 (1964); Agnew v. Moody, 330 F.2d 868, 869 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 867 (1964); Carpenter v. Dethmers, 253 F.2d 131, 132 (6th Cir. 1958); Niklaus v.
Simmons, 196 F. Supp. 691, 692 (D. Neb. 1961); Ginsburg v. Stern, 125 F. Supp. 596,
602 (MVD. Pa. 1954), aff'd, 225 F.2d 245 (3d Cir. 1955).
There is no doubt that the conduct of a court clerk meets the state action require-
ment for a section 1983 suit. Federal Comity, supra note 10, at 786.
132. 456 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1972).
133. Id. at 3.
134. Id. at 4. See note 109 supra & accompanying text.
135. Id. at 5.
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certain that the issuance of the writ is not, in most cases, directly pur-
suant to a judicial order. Nor should a clerk be allowed to contend
that he was acting pursuant to lawful authority if he issued a writ in
compliance with a state statute which was similar to those declared
unlawful by the Supreme Court. Although recovery from a court clerk
under such circumstances appears possible, it is more probable that
courts will be reluctant to subject clerks to liability in view of the
numerous decisions granting them immunity. 36
The Creditor's Lawyer
An attempted suit for damages by the debtor under section 1983
naming the creditor's lawyer as a defendant probably would fail. Al-
though the debtor may have been deprived of a constitutional right,
state action generally would not be involved. It has been held that an
attorney representing a private party in litigation is not a state func-
tionary within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act." 7
However, in states where the creditor's attorney, in lieu of the clerk
or judge, is permitted to initiate and process a seizure writ, the reason-
ing of the "state function" cases may support a finding of state action. 138
The troublesome doctrine of immunity will present a potential ob-
stacle for the debtor and an arguable defense for the four possible
defendants. It is the creditor, however, who is the most likely party for
a successful section 1983 suit. If the property is seized by an official of
the state, or privately by the creditor pursuant to statutorily authorized
procedure which does not require notice and a hearing, both state action
and an unconstitutional deprivation can be asserted. Moreover, the
creditor is the one least likely to be successful in raising an immunity
defense.
Waiver
Of greater utility to the creditor will be a showing that the debtor
validly waived his constitutional rights when he accepted the terms of
the installment sales contract or other financing arrangement. The utility
and validity of purported waivers of constitutional rights has been the
136. See note 131 supra.
137. Dieu v. Norton, 411 F.2d 761, 763 (7th Cir. 1969); Brown v. Dunne, 409 F.2d
341, 343 (7th Cir. 1969); Meier v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 356 F.2d 504 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 875 (1966); Skolnick v. Martin, 317 F.2d 855 (7th Cir.
1963).
138. See notes 79-82 supra & accompanying text.
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subject of an extended discussion elsewhere. 39 Although specific stand-
ards for determining the validity of attempted waivers have not been
promulgated by the Supreme Court, it is fair to assume that such
waivers must be made knowingly (thus raising questions of conspicu-
ous type and consumer awareness), voluntarily (bringing into ques-
tion the choices available to the debtor, the relative bargaining
positions of the parties, and the general character of the contract), and
intelligently (did the debtor understand the consequences of his action
-was he advised by counsel?) .14 The current judicial presumption against
waivers of constitutional rights augurs well for the aggrieved debtor
and suggests that a creditor would encounter substantial difficulty when
asserting a purported waiver in defense of a section 1983 claim-espe-
cially if the debtor is a low-income consumer entrapped by an unre-
sponsive sellers' market.
Statutes of Limitations and Laches
Appropriate statutory periods of limitation pose another possible
defense to a section 1983 action. 41 A specific limitation period was
not provided in the Civil Rights Act; 4 2 consequently, courts have as-
sumed that the statute of limitations of the forum state should be
applied.' 43 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should govern the
tolling of the state statute, however.' 44
Once it is decided that the state law of limitations is dispositive, the
applicable law within the forum state must be determined.-45 A state
may have separate statutes of limitations for liability created by a
139. See Due Process Revisited, supra note 35, at 365-81.
140. Id.
141. E.g., O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318, 324 (1914); Crawford v. Zeider, 326 F.2d
119, 121 (6th Cir. 1964); Swan v. Board of Higher Educ, 319 F.2d 56, 59 (2d Cir.
1963); Horn v. Bailie, 309 F.2d 167, 168 (9th Cir. 1962); Conrad v. Stitzel, 225 F. Supp.
244, 246 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1871: Continuing Vitality, 40
Norm DAMs LAW. 70, 73 (1964); Civil Remedy, supra note 70, at 851.
142. See Swan v. Board of Higher Educ., 319 F.2d 56, 59 (2d Cir. 1963).
143. E.g., Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946); Chattanooga Foundry
& Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 397 (1906); Campbell v. City of
Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 614 (1894); Swan v. Board of Higher Educ., 319 F.2d 56, 59
(2d Cir. 1963).
144. E.g, Jackson v. Duke, 259 F.2d 3, 6 (5th Cir. 1958); Mohler v. Miller, 235
F.2d 153, 155 (6th Cir. 1956); Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d 136, 140 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 825 (1947); Fitzgerald v. Appolonia, 323 F. Supp. 1269, 1270 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
145. See, e.g., Swan v. Board of Higher Educ, 319 F.2d 56, 59 (2d Cir. 1963).
19731
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
statute,146 for tortious conduct, 147 and for a catch-all category of "action
not otherwise provided for." 148 Most cases have applied the time period
for liability created by statute,' 49 but since statutory provisions vary
from state to state this result has not been uniform'15
°
Although the failure of Congress to specify a statute of limitations
has led the federal courts to adopt the local law of limitations for actions
at law,'-" the doctrine of laches is applicable when the federal right
created has its sole remedy in equity.152 When a party bringing a sec-
tion 1983 action seeks only declaratory and injunctive relief, the ques-
tion arises whether the action should be characterized as merely equi-
table so as to invoke the more flexible rules of laches. In Swan v. Board
of Higher Education,5 3 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
concluded that since the plaintiff also could have sought damages, he
was not asserting a federal right which had its sole remedy in equity.15
Thus, the statute of limitations was used.' 55 The Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit followed this approach in Madison v. Wood,'" ,5 where
a policeman brought a section 1983 action for damages caused by his
wrongful discharge. After his claim for damages was dismissed because
the statutory limitation period had run, he amended his complaint to
seek purely equitable relief. 5 7  The court barred his action on the
146. See, e.g., Campbell v. Weatherford, 427 F.2d 131, 132 (5th Cir. 1970); Romer v.
Leary, 425 F.2d 186, 187 (2d Cir. 1970); Swan v. Board of Higher Educ., 319 F.2d 56, 60
(2d Cir. 1963); Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187, 189 (9th Cir. 1962); Beauregard v.
Wingard, 230 F. Supp. 167, 171 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
147. See, e.g., Jackson v. Duke, 259 F.2d 3, 5 (5th Cir. 1958); Conrad v. Stitzel, 225
F.2d 59, 63 (7th Cir. 1958).
148. Wakat v. Harlib, 253 F.2d 59, 63 (7th Cir. 1958). See also Crawford v. Zeitler,
326 F.2d 119, 121 (6th Cir. 1964).
149. Civil Remedy, supra note 70, at 851.
150. See Savage v. United States, 450 F.2d 449, 451-52 (8th Cir. 1971); Madison v.
Wood, 410 F.2d 564, 565 (6th Cir. 1969); Henig v. Odorioso, 385 F.2d 491 (3rd Cir.
1967); Krum v. Sheppard, 255 F. Supp. 994 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
151. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946).
152. Id. There is one equitable doctrine which is applied even though the state
statute of limitations is appropriate. When a plaintiff has been injured by fraud, the
statute does not begin to run until the fraud either has been discovered or should
have been discovered with reasonable diligence. Id. at 397.
153. 319 F.2d 56 (2d Cir. 1963).
154. Id. at 59 n.5. Cf. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946); Russell v.
Todd, 309 U.S. 280, 289 (1940).
155. 319 F.2d at 59 n.5. Cf. Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 464 (1947).
156. 410 F.2d 564 (6th Cir. 1969).
157. Id. at 565.
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ground that equity will not grant relief when the applicable statute of
limitations bars a concurrent legal remedy.158
When placed in the context of the consumer transaction, several
conclusions regarding limitation of actions can be framed. If the debtor
seeks an injunction restraining a creditor from taking action against
property not yet detained, of course the problem of limitations will not
arise. If seizure has already occurred, however, it is likely that some
damages will have been suffered giving rise to an action at law. Thus,
the debtor, in most cases, must assert his claim within the time allowed
under the applicable statute of limitations. The characterization of the
action by the forum jurisdiction as tortious, statutory, or othervise,
of course, will be controlling.
State of Mind
Section 1983, unlike comparable provisions in the Criminal Code,'19
does not restrict recovery to cases of willful deprivation. Prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in Monroe v. Pape,'6 0 lower federal courts
were reluctant to accept the idea that a defendant could be held liable
without intentionally depriving the plaintiff of a constitutional right.'"'
Then, when the Court held in Monroe that section 1983 "should be
read against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible
for the natural consequences of his action," t6 it should have been evi-
dent that the Supreme Court merely interpreted the statute not to
require specific intent or willfulness.163 However, lower -federal courts
were reluctant to abandon their previous concepts,'6 primarily because
158. Id. at 567.
159. The applicable provision of the Criminal Code states:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom,
willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected
by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punish-
ments, pains, or penalties, on account of such inhabitant being an alien,
or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punish-
ment of citizens, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not
more than one year, or both....
18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970).
160. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
161. See Francis v. Lyman, 216 F.2d 583, 587-88 (1st Cir. 1954); Cobb. v. City of
Malden, 202 F.2d 701, 706-07 (1st Cir. 1953); Downie v. Powers, 193 F.2d 760, 764
(10th Cir. 1951).
162. 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961).
163. Id. at 180.
164. Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1871, supra note 141, at 80.
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of a misunderstanding of the Supreme Court's holding.1 5 The Court
did not hold that a defendant in a section 1983 action could not assert
any defense. Rather, as was emphasized in Pierson v. Ray,""' Monroe
merely held that:
A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state that
the officers had 'a specific intent to deprive a person of a federal
right,' but this holding, which related to requirements of pleading,
carried no implication as to which defenses would be available to
the police officers.16 7
It is logical to assume that a debtor asserting a section 1983 violation
need not allege an intentional act-or even a negligent or innocent act
-so long as he shows the deprivation of a constitutional right under
color of state law. There is no apparent policy consideration which
would call for a different rule where property rights, as opposed to
personal rights, are involved.""
Survival of the Cause of Action
Section 1986 of the Civil Rights Act specifically provides that the
legal representative of a party who has been killed as the result of a
conspiracy to interfere with civil rights may recover up to $5,000 in
damages from one who had the power to prevent the conspiracy but
failed to do so.' 69 Similar language does not appear in section 1983,
and under the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, it would
be logical to assume that Congress did not intend for section 1983 claims
to survive their victims. Moreover, section 1983 provides only for
recovery by the "party injured." 170 In Brazier v. Cherry,-7 ' however,
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected these arguments
and concluded that the congressional purpose for enacting section 1983
would be frustrated if a victim who died from a police beating was
165. id. at 80-81.
166. 386 US. 547 (1967).
167. Id. at 556.
168. See notes 49-51 supra & accompanying text.
169. 42 US.C. S 1986 (1970).
170. However, in a wrongful death action brought under section 1983, the Federal
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois construed "party injured" to include
the administrator of the deceased's estate. Davis v. Johnson, 138 F. Supp. 572, 575 (N.D.
111. 1955).
171. 293 F.2d 401 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921 (1961).
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denied recovery.172 The court relied upon section 1988,1 73which allows
state law to be used when federal law does not furnish a suitable rem-
edy.174 Under the authority of section 1988, the court invoked two
Georgia statutes which allowed the decedent's claim to survive17 and
provided a new cause of action on behalf of the widow for wrongful
death.
In a case more analogous to the debtor-creditor problem, Nelson v.
Knox,177 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that the
executrix of the deceased plaintiff could pursue the plaintiff's section
1983 claim for damages to his business. Interestingly, the court intimated
that there would have been no survival had the plaintiff alleged depriva-
tion of a personal right rather than a property right.78 Although this
distinction is questionable, it would not be important in the debtor-
creditor context where property rights are usually involved. It can,
therefore, he concluded that the death of the debtor will not bar a
section 1983 action.
INjuNcIV RELIEF UNDER SECTION 1983
Although this Note is concerned primarily with the debtor's right to
damages, there are several instances in which injunctive relief will be
more appropriate. For example, in a suit against a public official, the
immunity doctrine may bar the recovery of damages, but if injunctive
relief is sought instead, immunity would be inapplicable. 79 Also, it
172. Id. at 404. See Page, State Law and the Damages Remedy Under the Civil Rights
Act: Some Problems in Federalism, 43 DENVER LJ. 480, 487 (1966); Comment, 14 STAN.
L. REv. 386 (1962); Comment, 40 TEXAS L. REv. 1050 (1962); Comment, 47 VA. L. REv.
1241 (1961); Comment, 15 VAm. L. REv. 623 (1962).
173. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970). For an argument that section 1988 was intended
to apply only to procedural forms of "process" and "remedy" see Note, Survival of
'Actions Brought Under Federal Statutes, 63 CoLuM. L. REv. 290, 296 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as Survival of Actions].
174. 293 F.2d at 405. Accord, Pritchard v. Smith, 298 F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1961).
175. GA. CoDe ANN. § 3-505 (1962).
176. GA. CODE ANN. § 105-1302 (1968).
177. 230 F.2d 483 (6th Cir. 1956). It is also clear that a section 1983 action will
survive the death of the defendant. See, e.g., Pritchard v. Smith, 289 F.2d 153 (8th Cin.
1961).
178. The rationale is that a personal wrong ceases to exist when the person injured
can no longer be benefited by a recovery, or when the person inhicting the injury
can no longer be punished. On the other hand, where an injury to property can
be recovered by the decedents estate there is seemingly justification for allowing that
recovery. 230 F.2d at 484. Apparently this was the approach of the federal common
law. Survival of Actions, supra note 173, at 294.
179. See Cassidy v. Ceci, 320 F. Supp. 223, 228 (E.D. Wisc. 1970); Stambler v. Dil-
lon, 288 F. Supp. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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may be the best approach in a class action brought on behalf of a large
group of debtors.180
There are, however, several barriers to federal injunctive relief.181
One barrier may be raised by the federal anti-injunction statute,182
which applies only to suits which already have been instituted in a state
court:
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay
proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act
of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to
protect or effectuate its judgments.'8
Federal courts, moreover, frequently refuse to grant injunctive relief
under principles of comity,' s8 equity, 85 and federalism. 86  These re-
strictions are applicable to contemplated federal interference with threat-
ened as well as pending state procedures. 8 7 In Younger v. Harris, 8
180. E.g., Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 92 S. Ct. 1113 (1972).
181. For a thorough discussion of federal injunctions being applied to state prosecu-
tions, see Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1871 Versus the Anti-Injunction Statute: The
Need for A Federal Forum, 1971 WASH. U.L.Q. 625 [hereinafter cited as Anti-Injunc-
tion Statute].
182. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970).
183. Id. The exceptions concerned with jurisdiction and judgments usually will not
affect a section 1983 action and will not be discussed further. Anti-Injunction Statute,
supra note 181, at 630 n.27.
184. The doctrine of comity between courts teaches that one court should defer
action on causes properly within its jurisdiction until courts of another sovereignty with
concurrent powers, and already cognizant of the litigation, have had an opportunity
to pass upon the matter. Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1949).
185. It is a "basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence that courts of equity should not
act, and particularly should not act to restrain a criminal prosecution, when the moving
party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied
equitable relief." Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971).
186. The requirements of federalism usually are expressed in terms of exhaustion or
absention. The inapplicability of exhaustion to section 1983 actions was established
in McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 672 (1963), where the Supreme Court
held that the purpose of section 1983 would be defeated if the assertion of a federal
claim in a federal court had to await an attempt to vindicate the same claim in a state
court. Under the abstention doctrine, a federal court will not decide the constitu-
tionality of a state statute when an interpretation of the statute by a state court may
render the federal court interpretation unnecessary. C. WRirr, THE LAW OF FaaEwR
COURTS § 52 (2d ed. 1970). The abstention doctrine has been held appropriate in
section 1983 actions. Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 176 (1959). But it has been
held inappropriate in other cases where first amendment rights are the basis of the
action. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
187. Anti-Injunction Statute, supra note 181, at 630.
188. 401 U.S. 37,54 (1971).
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the Supreme Court held that unconstitutionality of a statute on its face
does not alone justify an injunction against good faith attempts to en-
force it. Before federal injunctive intervention in a pending state court
prosecution is proper, there must be extraordinary circumstances where
irreparable injury is both great and immediate, or there must be a show-
ing of bad faith harassment." 9 Whether the same principles should
be applied to state civil proceedings has not yet been determined. In
Mitchum v. Foster,10 this question was noted but left for a determina-
tion by the district court on remand. Justice White, however, has
stated that the considerations which restrict interference in criminal
cases are equally applicable to state civil litigation.191 Indeed, Justice
Stewart believes that courts of equity traditionally have been more
reluctant to intervene in criminal prosecutions than in civil cases.1 92
Therefore, it probably is safe to conclude that debtors seeking to enjoin
a potential property deprivation will, at the very most, have to satisfy
the Younger standard.
Assuming that the debtor seeking injunctive relief under section 1983
for a pending deprivation has satisfied the federalism requirements, the
next inquiry is whether his efforts will be thwarted by the federal
anti-injunction statute. In other words, the question is whether section
1983 is "expressly authorized by Act of Congress" as an exception to
the anti-injunction statute. In Mitchum v. Foster,193 the Supreme Court
unequivocally held section 1983 to be such.194 This decision was justi-
fied by the legislative history of section 1983, which demonstrated an
intent of Congress to alter the relationship between the states and the
nation with respect to the protection of federally-created rights.'
In light of the Court's earlier decision in Lynch, that the anti-injunc-
tion statute was inapplicable to the Connecticut garnishment statute,
the Mitchum decision had a particularly important impact in the debtor-
creditor area. The plaintiff in Lynch sought section 1983 injunctive
relief against all Connecticut sheriffs who levied on bank accounts, as
well as against creditors who invoked the garnishment statute.196 The
189. Id. at 53.
190. 92 S. Ct. 2151, 2163 (1972) (concurring opinion).
191. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 92 S. Ct. 1113, 1126 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
192. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 55 n.2 (1971) (concurring opinion).
193. 92 S. Ct. 2151 (1972).
194. Id. at 2162.
195. Id.
196. 92 S. Ct. 1113, 1115 (1972).
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Court held that the and-injunction act was inapplicable because the
Connecticut garnishment procedure was not a "proceeding" in the state
court. 197 This result obtained only because Connecticut was one of the
few states which authorized garnishment without court participation,
and the garnishment occurred before the debtor had been served with
process. 19  Had it not been for the Mitchum decision holding section
1983 to be an express exception to the anti-injunction statute, debtors
would have been forced to make tedious distinctions among the hun-
dreds of state attachment, garnishment, and replevin statutes to deter-
mine whether, indeed, they involved a "proceeding." After Mitchum,
the debtor seeking section 1983 injunctive relief need not concern him-
self with the federal anti-injunction statute; it is important to note,




Having established that section 1983 provides a remedy against a
creditor or state official acting under color of state law when the debtor
has suffered an unconstitutional deprivation of property, the question
arises whether damages can be recovered. The discussion of this issue
will assume that the initial question of liability has been determined in
favor of the debtor.
The language of section 1983, "shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law ... .", clearly implies that damages are awardable
to the plaintiff. The legislative history indicates nothing to the con-
trary."9 The cases awarding damages under section 1983 have been
legion,20° and although there are only a few cases to date which have
awarded damages to a debtor who has sued under the Act,20' the Su-
197. Id. at 1122.
198. Id. at 1123.
199. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); cf. Shapo, supra note 1.
200. See, e.g, Haines v. Kerner, 92 S. Ct. 594 (1972); Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129
(2d Cir. 1966); Lucero v. Donovan, 354 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1965); Cole v. Smith, 344
F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1965); Maryland v. Heyse, 315 F.2d 312 (10th Cir. 1963); Hurlburt v.
Graham, 323 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1963); Rhoads v. Horvat, 270 F. Supp. 307 (D. Colo.
1967); Brooks v. Moss, 242 F. Supp. 531 (W.D.S.C. 1965).
201. See, e.g., McMeans v. Schwartz, 330 F. Supp. 1397 (S.D. Ala. 1971) (liability
imposed for prejudgment garnishment in violation of due process).
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preme Court cases which established liability are quite recent and it
is probable that their numbers will increase.2°2
Applicable Law
Assuming a debtor can recover damages of some kind for the viola-
tion of his constitutional rights, it is appropriate to consider whether
state or federal rules control. Although section 1983 is silent on this
point, section 1988 provides:
The jurisdiction in civil .. matters conferred on the district
courts by the provisions of this chapter and Title 18, for the pro-
tection of all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and
for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity
with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable
to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are not
adopted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary
to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the
common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and
statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such
civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent
with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be ex-
tended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of
the cause... 203
The court in Basista v. Weir2 4 interpreted this section to imply that
a federal law of damages should be applied because of the need for uni-
formity in the protection afforded by the Civil Rights Act. It stated
further that the effect of applying different standards to different types
of damages (for example, applying federal law to compensatory and
nominal damages, and state law to punitive damages) "would be to
create a legal hybrid of an incredible and unworkable kind." 205
One criticism of the Basista rationale is that the federal forum might
allow damages that would not be recoverable in state courts or might
circumvent state statutory limits on liability.206 Proponents of this criti-
202. "Damages may even be awarded to him for the wrongful deprivation." Fuentes
v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 1995 (1972).
203. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970).
204. 340 F.2d 74 (3rd Cir. 1965).
205. Id. at 87.
206. See Page, State Law and the Damages Remedy Under the Civil Rights Act: Some
Problems in Federalism, 43 DENVER L. 480, 488 (1966), citing CoLoRMO TmALI LAwye'S
Ass'N, 13 TA, LTALK No. 5, p. 2 (1966); Niles, Civil Actions for Damages under the
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
cism argue that state law always should be applied unless the state pro-
visions would frustrate the purposes of the Civil Rights Act;20 7 further-
more, they claim that a review of civil rights cases reveals that a con-
sistent federal law of damages simply does not exist.208
The Supreme Court apparently settled this federalism controversy
by its interpretation of section 1988 in Sullivan v. Little Hunting
Park:2°9 "[A]s we read section 1988... both federal and state rules on
damages may be utilized, whichever better serves the policies expressed
in the federal statutes. The rule of damages, whether drawn from fed-
eral or state sources, is a federal rule responsive to the need whenever
a federal right is impaired." 210 Although the action in Sullivan was
brought under section 1982, there are no apparent policy reasons which
would preclude a similar construction in an action brought under a
companion section such as section 1983.
Theory of Liability
Once a state statute is found to be an unconstitutional violation of
due process, the form of the statute (attachment, garnishment, Uniform
Commercial Code) should not affect the kind or measure of damages
recoverable by the debtor. Rather, recoverability should be determined
by the underlying theory upon which the court holds the defendant
liable.2 1
1
The federal courts frequently have stated that an action under the
Civil Rights Act lies in tort and, with little discussion of the subject,
have applied traditional tort rules in the determination of liability and
the measurement of damages.212 The commonly cited source of this
theory of liability is Justice Douglas' now familiar statement in Monroe
v. Pape: "Section [1983] should be read against the background of
tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences
of his actions." 213
Federal Civil Rights Statutes, 45 TEXAS L. REv. 1015, 1024 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Niles].
207. Niles, supra note 206, at 1025.
208. 1d.
209. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
210. Id. at 240. See also Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1961).
211. Niles, supra note 206, at 1025.
212. Id.
213. 365 U.S. at 187.
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Use of the tort theory, however, has led to considerable confusion
in awarding damages for civil rights violations;214 the law of torts is
concerned primarily with compensating an individual for harm done
to his person or property by the conduct of another,215 whereas the
original policy of the civil rights statute was punitive in nature and
was intended to be a deterrent to the violation of constitutional rights.216
An award of damages under the Civil Rights Act should not depend
solely on the common law test of whether the plaintiff has suffered a
measurable physical or economic injury, but also upon whether de-
fendant's conduct comes within the scope of actions that the statutes
were intended to penalize. 217
As a result of the failure of courts to perceive or acknowledge the
difference in policies, damages which are actually punitive in nature are
awarded and deceptively labeled "compensatory." The confusion of
terms also extends to "consequential" and "special" damages.
The majority of suits under section 1983 in which damages have been
awarded have involved common law torts, such as assault and battery,218
false imprisonment, 219 and negligence. 20 Indeed, the violation of the
constitutional right alone has been termed to be a "constitutional tort." 221
However, courts also have recognized a right to recover at least nominal
damages for deprivation of constitutional rights where no measurable
physical or economic injury has been sustained. 2
In view of the reliance on the tort theory and the existing confusion
in the application of terms with regard to damages, a major task incum-
bent upon a plaintiff debtor is to identify and delineate the injured
interests for which he seeks recovery. This is also important for the
purpose of providing proper instructions to the jury for avoiding chal-
lenges of double or excessive compensation.2=
214. See Niles, supra note 206, at 1026.
215. W. PRossER, LAW OF TORTS § 1 (4th ed. 1971).
216. See generally Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Shapo, supra note 1.
217. Niles, supra note 206, at 1026.
218. Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536 (10th Cir. 1963).
219. Nesmith v. Alford, 318 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 975
(1964).
220. See Coleman v. Johnston, 247 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1957).
221. See Shapo, supra note 1, at 329.
222. See, e.g., Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 87 (3rd Cir. 1965); Rhoads v. Horvat, 270
F. Supp. 307 (D. Colo. 1967); Washington v. Official Ct. Stenographer, 251 F. Supp. 945
(E.D. Pa. 1966).
223. See Niles, supra note 206, at 1026-30.
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In order to facilitate discussion of this difficult task, it is desirable to
divide the possible fact situations into two categories: (1) where the
conduct of the defendant includes a common law tort; and (2) where
the defendant's conduct results in injury, but where no common law
tort is involved.
Conduct Including Common-Law Tort
One significant effect of an intentional common law tort is that it
could strip a minor public official of his qualified immunity.224 A state
official thereby could become liable for damages resulting from a wrong-
ful appropriation or conversion. A creditor, however, has no immunity
and could be liable at common law for wrongful appropriation, con-
version, or misrepresentation of a claim against the debtor.
The plaintiff debtor should be aware that although his loss or injury
results from only one act by the defendant, such action may give rise
to two distinct torts-a common-law tort and a constitutional tort. The
courts frequently fail to make this distinction, and as a result the plain-
tiff may be deprived of the broader scope of recovery arising out of the
constitutional tort. 5 For example, one of the advantages of suing
under section 1983 is that punitive damages can be awarded even in the
absence of out-of-pocket loss.2 26 In other words, a creditor who for
malicious purposes misrepresents a claim against the debtor and de-
prives him of his property by acting in accordance with a statute that
does not provide notice and hearing could be liable for punitive dam-
ages even if he later returned the property and the debtor suffered no
actual economic loss. Under the general rule of tort law, however, an
award of punitive damages may not be made without a showing of
actual damage. 7 A second advantage offered by section 1983 is that
the plaintiff may recover, in addition to the compensation for the
common law tort, an amount based solely upon the constitutional tort.
For instance, damages for mental suffering caused by a deprivation of
valuable property might be claimed.2
224. See note 109 supra & accompanying text.
225. See Niles, supra note 206.
226. Cases cited note 222 supra; Chubbs v. City of New York, 324 F. Supp. 1183
(E.D.N.Y. 1971).
227. Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 86 (3rd Cir. 1965) (citing Pennsylvania law); Hol-
liday v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 256 F.2d 297 (8th Cir. 1958) (citing Missouri law);
Hamerly v. Denton, 359 F.2d 121 (Ala. 1961). See generally Annor., 17 A.L.R.2d 527-5a(1951).
228. Cf. Donovan v. Reinbold, 433 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1970) (mental suffering from
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Another problem which may arise in the absence of diversity juris-
diction is the possibility that the federal court may adjudicate the com-
mon law tort claim only if the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction is
applicable; in other words, there must be a substantial federal claim
before both claims can be heard in a federal forum. This could mean
that unless the damages resulting from the violation of the constitu-
tional right alone are substantial, the court will not entertain the claim
arising out of the common law tort.2
In order to avoid this problem, the plaintiff should proceed upon the
theory that the common law tort is a "lesser included offense" within
the scope of the constitutional tort. Taking this view, the court in Rue
v. Snyder30 found it unnecessary to rule on the issue of pendent juris-
diction because it considered that the damages recoverable under the
common-law tort were included in the damages awardable for the claim
arising under section 1983.231
Conduct Not Including Common-Law Tort
In a situation where the creditor has acted in good faith in following
the provisions of an existing state statute to gain possession of the debtor's
property, it is doubtful whether a common law tort has been suffered.
When injury is incurred by the debtor as a consequence of the uncon-
stitutional taking of his property, the absence of a common-law tort
makes it more difficult to frame an appropriate theory of liability. The
injury involved could take the form of a financial loss if the property
taken was being used in the production of income or as a means of
transportation to the place of employment, or if the seizure, usually in
the form of garnishment, caused the debtor to lose his job. Further-
more, if the property taken is a necessity or a means of procuring neces-
sities (such as wages needed to buy food or medicines), physical injury
could result; such injury presumably would be compensated.
In jurisdictions where the constitutionality of the particular statute
has not been adjudicated, it is likely that the constitutional violation
was not foreseeable to the creditor.
loss of a job); Antelope v. George, 211 F. Supp. 657 (D. Idaho 1962); Solomon v.
Pennsylvania RR., 96 F. Supp. 709 (SD.N.Y. 1951).
229. See Page, State Law and the Damages Remedy Under the Civil Rights Act:
Some Problems in Federalism, 43 DENvER L.J. 480 (1966).
230. 249 F. Supp. 740 (ED. Tenn. 1966).
231. Id. at 743. See also Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187, 190 (9th Cir. 1962).
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On what basis, then, is the creditor to be held liable for these dam-
ages? In construing section 1983, the court in Cobb v. City of Maldene2
stated:
[I]t would seem to make no difference that the conduct of the
defendants might not have been tortious at common law; for the
Act, if read literally, creates a new federal tort, where all that has
to be proved is that the defendants as a result of their conduct
under the color of state law have in fact caused harm to the plain-
tiff by depriving him of rights . . . secured by the Constitution
of the United States.233
The court also said that the Act merely expresses a prima facie liability,
leaving to the courts the task of deciding on an ad boc basis the defenses
of official immunity which might be appropriate to each particular case.
Since the creditor has no official immunity, he stands squarely within
the broad sweep of the Act if he cannot claim any other defense.
This apparently was the view of the courts in McMeans v. Scbwart 234
and Collins v. Viceroy Hotel CorpY.3 Such a literal reading was espe-
cially evident in McMeans, where the defendant creditor acting in good
faith merely filed suit and requested prejudgment garnishment. He filed
the appropriate affidavit, affirming the validity of the debt, and posted
the required bond. Moreover, the state, not the defendant, issued and
served the writ. The court held the Alabama garnishment statute to
be unconstitutional, and without discussion of the issue of damages,
granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to the creditor's
liability under section 1983.26 The decision in McMeans had the ap-
parent effect of expanding the Monroe theory of tort liability. McMeans
appears to be the only case directly concerning the actions of a creditor.
Two cases expressing a contrary view and setting forth more stringent
criteria for liability under section 1983 arose from charges concerning
conduct of police officers.
In Mullins v. City of River Rouge,287 it was held that an officer could
be exposed to section 1983 liability only upon a showing of gross neg-
ligence; specifically the defendant police officer was held not liable for
232. 202 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1953).
233. Id. at 706.
234. 330 F. Supp. 1397 (S.D. Ala. 1971).
235. 338 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
236. Id. at 398.
237. 338 F. Supp. 26 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
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his failure to diagnose and treat plaintiff's injuries, where the injuries
were not obvious and no request for aid was made. A closer case to
the situation in issue is Bowens v. Knazzee,28 in which the plaintiff
brought an action under section 1983 seeking damages for an illegal
search of his person. The court held that the officer was not liable where
the legality of the particular search technique had never been considered
by the Illinois Supreme Court and the officer could not reasonably have
foreseen that a deprivation of constitutional rights might have resulted
from his conduct. In its decision, the court reviewed general principles
of tort liability and the test for tortious conduct. It observed that in
ordinary tort litigation, the jury is allowed to define and apply its own
standard of reasonableness appropriate in the circumstances of the de-
fendant's conduct. The court concluded, however, that the tort created
by the Civil Rights Act is not amenable to such treatment:
The measure of a citizen's constitutional rights is not left to the
determination of the community-at-large. It is determined by
the courts. If that standard has not yet been enunciated by a court
in a manner which makes its applicability to the incident at hand
dear, the potential defendant cannot be expected to conform his
conduct to it. Unlike the requirements of a statute or the judg-
ment of the community which can be applied retroactively, the
retroactive application of the judgment of a court as to the re-
quirements of the Constitution-based not on community standards
but on legal reasoning-would place a defendant in an impossible
position.239
The logic of Bo'wens certainly is compelling in terms of general appli-
cation to actions prosecuted under section 1983. It is submitted, how-
ever, that the MeMeans decision should receive hospitable acceptance
n situations involving creditors who deprive debtors of their property
in violation of Sniadach, Fuentes, and Lynch. The mere fact that a
creditor's home state has been delinquent about responding to federal
constitutional standards of creditor conduct should not protect local
creditors against liability. In other words, all creditors should be held
to the standards of Sniadach, Fuentes, and Lynch regardless of local
procedures for creditor attachment. A creditor should not be heard
to say that he acted in good faith if his conduct violated the teachings
of Sniadach, even if such conduct satisfied state procedural requirements.
238. 237 F. Supp. 826 (NfD. IMI. 1965).
239. Id. at 829.
1973] 669
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:627
Any departure from McMeans would allow local creditors to benefit
from a "lag" in state responsiveness to the Supreme Court's elucidations
concerning the debtor-creditor relationship. Moreover, the result in
McMeans should not be construed as a retroactive application of chang-
ing Constitutional standards-whereas retroactivity would compensate
pre-Fuentes deprivations, 240 McMeans merely holds all creditors to the
Sniadach standard irrespective of state procedures.
Additional Recovery-Costs and Attorney's Fees
As a separate element of recovery, aggrieved debtors should seek
attorney's fees. The Supreme Court in Newman v. Piggie Park Enter-
prises, Inc.241 stated that one who succeeds in a suit under Title II of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,242 "should ordinarily recover attorney's
fees unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust." 243
240. The McMeans decision may be said to employ a new standard retroactively only
to the extent that it holds creditors liable for their conduct despite adherence to estab-
lished state procedures. In a larger sense, however, it does not employ new standards
retroactively at all; the constitutional rationale of Sniadach had been promulgated well
in advance of the creditor's activity in McMeans.
Retroactive application of changing constitutional standards has had a checkered
history in the Supreme Court. Compare, e.g., Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425
(1886) 'qth Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940).
See also DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968), where the Court discussed several
factors involved in determinations of retroactivity. Foremost among these factors is
the purpose to be served by the new constitutional rule. Desist v. United States, 394
U.S. 244, 249 (1969). In the Sniadach-Fuentes situation, the clear design of the Court
was to deter unconstitutional creditor action. More specifically, the rules might have
been intended to be corrective or compensatory, in which case retroactive application
of Sniadach and Fuentes could be argued. It seems clear, however, that widespread
reliance on long-standing rules concerning debtor-creditor relations militates against
retroactive application of the new rules.
It seems just as clear, however, that reliance on unconstitutional state procedures
should not be tolerated in the wake of Fuentes. As a practical matter, almost all
creditors involved in attachment or garnishment proceedings retain legal counsel.
Thus, they should be presumed to know the rules evolved in Sniadach and Fuentes, and
they should not be allowed to flaunt the new constitutional standard by adhering to
the kinds of state procedures banned by the Supreme Court. In this context, then,
what might seem to be a harsh result in McMeans is not harsh at all; indeed, McMeans
merely commands immediate adherence to constitutional standards of creditor conduct.
241. 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
242. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3 (b) (1970). This section provides for the court's discretion
in the awarding of attorney's fees. Although the case involved a suit under a different
civil rights act, the court's reasoning is considered to be pertinent as a supporting argu-
ment.
243. 390 US. at 402.
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The Court stated that a plaintiff acts "not for himself alone but also as
a 'private attorney general' vindicating a policy that Congress consid-
ered of the highest priority" in bringing litigation challenging racial
discrimination.244
Further, the Supreme Court in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,245
after considering the general rule of nonrecoverability in the absence
of statutory authorization, awarded attorney's fees to a shareholder who
brought a derivative action alleging the use of deceptive proxy state-
ments in a pending merger. The Court stated that by vindicating the
statutory policy against misleading proxy statements, the plaintiff "ren-
dered a substantial service to the corporation and its shareholders." 246
By analogy, in bringing an action challenging the constitutionality of a
state statute, the plaintiff-debtor also is vindicating a policy Congress
considered of the highest priority-protection of the fundamental right
of due process.
The debtor also should seek an award of the costs incurred in litiga-
tion; such costs might properly be included in the measure of damages,
since they clearly were occasioned by the civil rights infringement. For
example, if a debtor brings an action in a state court to enjoin an attach-
ment or garnishment and loses, he should claim the costs incurred in
that litigation as a collateral injury to his constitutional right violation
when he files suit in the appropriate federal district court under section
1983. A case in point by way of analogy is McArthur v. Pennington,247
in which the plaintiffs were awarded costs incurred in defending a prior
criminal action which was the source of the civil rights litigation.248 A
further justification lies in the fact that state courts generally agree that
where an attachment is used to secure quasi in rem jurisdiction over the
party or is used only for security purposes, costs incurred in defense or
dissolution of the attachment (as distinguished from a defense on the
underlying debt) are allowed as damages in a subsequent suit for wrong-
ful attachment.249 A parallel can be drawn between a subsequent suit
244. Id. See also Irvin v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 308 F. Supp. 152 (ED. Ark. 1970).
245. 396 US. 375 (1970).
246. Id. at 396.
247. 253 F. Supp. 420 (ED. Tenn. 1963).
248. Cf. Johnson, Exclusionary Zoning: Damage Actions Under the Cisil Rights Act,
1971 LAw & Soc. ORDER 538, 549.
249. Annot., 25 A.L.R. 579-92 (1923); Annot., 71 A..R. 1458-662 (1931); Comment,
Attachment-Measure of Damage in an Action on the Bond for Wrongful Attachment,
25 S. CAL. L. REv. 452 (1952).
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for a wrongful attachment and a subsequent suit for an unconstitutional
attachment under section 1983.
CONCLUSION
Considering the abuses inherent in the creditor-debtor relationship-
whether they be in financing, repayment, defective merchandise, or
fraudulent sales schemes-perhaps nothing hits the credit purchaser
harder than having his wages frozen or seeing his household goods being
carried away without having been afforded the opportunity to have
his day in court. Although it certainly may be true that most debtors
have no justifiable reason for defaulting, the potentiality for harm to
those debtors who are able to raise a valid defense compels the conclu-
sion that the predominance of the former class of debtors should not
impair the procedural protection afforded the latter. More importantly,
minimum constitutional safeguards cannot be made to vary among the
situations of particular purchasers.
Prior to 1969, the debtor who had his wages frozen or property re-
moved without prior notice and hearing had but one avenue of redress;
it was necessary to convince a state court that the creditor had violated
the Constitution. In most cases he was unsuccessful. In 1973, however,
it is established law that one may not be deprived of his property with-
out the procedural protection granted in the Constitution; if, in fact,
there is a seizure made in contravention of this principle, the wronged
debtor can sue in a federal court and obtain damages or injunctive relief
under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. Therefore, a creditor who
deprives his debtors of property under -authority of a garnishment, at-
tachment, or replevin statute will be doing so at his own risk. Although
it has not been determined definitively, it is possible that secured parties
following peaceful repossession procedures outlined in the Uniform
Commercial Code could encounter the same peril.
In a debtor's section 1983 complaint, the plaintiff must show that he
has been deprived of his property, without due process of law. To do
so necessitates a showing that the seizure was made by the state, or by
an individual acting under color of state law. If the creditor acts pur-
suant to an allegedly unconstitutional state statute, the courts will or-
dinarily deem that action sufficient to satisfy the requirement of "color
of law." Undeniably, the creditor has retained the protection of certain
defenses; significantly, however, the defense of immunity will be un-
available to him.
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Ultimate success, of course, lies with both the debtor's attorney and
a sympathetic court. Despite the decades of analogous precedent sup-
porting him, the plaintiff deprived of constitutional rights must be able
to correlate his specific fact situation with others which have been rem-
edied in the past. A debtor may never become an actual victim of a
wrongful taking, but in any case he can be secure in the knowledge that,
should it ever occur, federal law has afforded him adequate legal ma-
chinery with which to redress his deprivation.
